IX. Experience of the animate body as a necessary element of the world-experience. Normality of the organism, and normality as such in its world-constitutive function

No. 53

<Human self-experience and world-experience conveyed by the organism>

Intentionality as human [intentionality], but man himself an intentional having[[1]](#footnote-1)

<§1. The world – a total acquisition of intentional life>

The world is what it is for us as the [world] of our univocal “intentional” acceptance:[[2]](#footnote-2) It is currently accepted by us within the current relating-to in the mode of univocal certainty. It is then [accepted] with a horizon of possible acceptance, with the consciousness of being able to continue the univocal relating-to in such manifold ways, that the contentually changeable being-sense must always be univocally combinable under the title “the same world”, of which continuously something else, something known and unknown comes into consciousness, comes to the fore in firm certainty of the being while cancelling the illusion, while balancing doubts, etc. **We are** **in our “relating-to”,** in our manifold “intentionality” thus **carriers of the world’s being**. The accordance of the certainty of being which encompasses the world being for us as unity of our acceptance, is nothing else but a mode of our current conscious life, as well as the discordancy entering the **[604]** universal accordance and its connection is a mere element of this life. No less the current experience as mode of the intentionality, namely as mode of the presenting-itself of that which is intended, as well as this simply within the correlative mode of the “it itself” is something purely subjective. Again a subjective mode is any kind of adequation of non-experiencing opinion (initially understood here as opinion in the certainty of being) to self-giving experience; thus verification of the opinion <is> something subjective, and <likewise> that which is true (as being “right”, as according to the object itself). Etc. Finally, also the acquisition of a “knowledge” of the object itself within experiencing is subjective. In a good sense it is ambivalently said: “Experiencing results in experience”, whereby with “experience” a habitual acquisition is understood, simply the lasting knowledge, having been acquired through the first experiencing, with the potentiality, the factual possibility, to reactivate the former experience, and to become certain of the experienced as being the same, as being still and continuously valid. Etc. There is not another world for us than the world which we constantly have in current, and together with that in habitual certainty as univocally unified universe of “realities”, of ”objects”, of things relatively being for themselves as unities of acceptance of univocal multiplicities.

**The world**, as respectively being for us, and being for us through the totality of our communalized life is a **total acquisition during a continuously proceeding further acquiring**. As an intentional acquisition it has the shape of the beings which are respectively accepted by us, and as that [it has] a horizon of acceptance with open ranges of indeterminacy and unacquaintedness of the being which is horizon-like meant along, accepted along. But this as well is a form of the habitual acquisition. The unknown being is already acquired as something unknown and yet being, as something already now <being>, although as ambiguous, <in> indeterminacy predelineated potentiality of the current acquiring of a certain being-sense which by the help of this predelineation has its form, its ontological structure in advance, within which all possibilities need to remain. Thus it has a unity of disjunction with regard to which only experience and induction have to perform the determining decision. But within the continuous life, whether on purpose or **[605]** without any purpose, a process of experience as <a process> of determining acquisition of something being constantly proceeds. Accordingly, like the world within the Whatever thus everything belonging to it [to the world], single realities, the unknown as well as the known, is constantly being as habitual acquisition of vivid intentionality flowingly shaping itself further, shaping itself anew.

<§2.> Constituting subjectivity and man in the world. <The experiential superiority of the experienced men within the world’s realm>

But now the **issue** accrues: If the world for us is a univocal universe of relatively univocal intentional unities of certain ways and forms of the intentional life, or rather, [if it] receives its lasting being from there as lasting acquisition of such life (as “constituting” itself therein), - how can we ourselves belong to this world as worldlinesses, as objects of the world, ourselves as intentional unities of such a kind, as suchlike acquired habitualities of our acquiring life?[[3]](#footnote-3) All single realities are indeed, as being implied within the total acquisition “world” intentional acquisitions themselves. This now shall also hold true for us ourselves, and indeed it is doubtlessly true. We do experience ourselves as realities being in the world. How can we, as intentional subjects, then be carriers of the world? Or else: How shall subjectivity itself, constituting world within its intentional life as a certain habitual acquisition, emerge among the constituting acquisitions under the title “man”, as acquisition? How is the experience of men as being objects within the world possible, and how is it possible – which seems to be a fact obviously -, that the intentional life, the conscious life in every form, that <of the> actuality as well as <that of the> habituality, in short: that all the life constituting the world still is itself experienced in a worldly way, and that under the title “human person”, or “human mental life” as a matter of fact it belongs to the being-sense of the world?

There are men among the realities; like other realities <they> find their place within the universal form of the world, the spatio-temporality, **[606]** and [they are] individuated within it according to their places. That which is a concrete individual within the spatio-temporality (something real in the pregnant sense), is a persisting unity of real changes and has the form of causality,<which means> to be and to be able to be only under conditional circumstances. Thus men as well. But what a radical difference it is on the other hand that men are experienceable objects and experiencing subjects at the same time, and that this peculiarity itself is part of their worldly being-sense, and that we still have to say to ourselves: “It is conscious life and eventually experiencing [life] through which world is for us men, and is what it is for us”.

Let us consider: The experience of men has an experiential primacy in that everyone continuously experiences himself if he experiences the world as awake Ego at all. In each currently present, conscious world, in each perceptual world-field I am necessarily there as a human person, [I am] an object among objects therein. And accordingly likewise in each field of recollection, and even in each fictional field of intuition, but then simply as fictionally changed Ego, as an Ego in the mode of “as if I thereby was a perceiving subject”. But the other men are in a certain way predominant as well by way of experience, although it is not necessary that they (like I myself) are actually experienced. The world is in advance not my world, [the world]of the fictionally isolated Ego, but as objective <world> [it is] a world for everyone. As long as we experience ourselves humanly and worldly, there is in advance a humanity within our world-field with known and unknown things. The gorilla, the rhinoceros, countless kinds of animals and plants had to be discovered first. Men could not be discovered at all; I cannot find myself as man without already having the horizon of humanity, and only the being of certain men, ethnic groups, human nations and the like, needed to be discovered.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**[607]**

<§3. The question of the possibility of a human> *solus* <and of a world without men being conscious to him>

Or are these contingencies of **our** human being? Is it conceivable that a man was – as that experiencing the world, and within it [experiencing] himself -, but initially being conscious of it only as a world without men, nay rather without any notion of something like fellow men, and only afterwards discovering other men? Obviously this is a possibility easy to be made completely intuitional, that is, to be made evident, like other similar possibilities supposedly being quite doubtless: of a world without men, without animate beings as such, or of a world in which once animate organisms with psychic life and eventually men emerged from merely material elements. However, maybe it is not that easy to consider such pretended possibilities right to the end, to put it into more pregnant words: to make its being-sense that perfectly intuited that the evidence of this possibility actually accomplishes itself, or – possibly – that as being an illusionary evidence it annuls itself in contradiction within the synthesis of the intuitions which are to be combined.

Could the being-sense “world”, which the feigned *solus* would have acquired, and could acquire, be the same in ontological form as that of our [world], that of the world actually to be called thus? How about the spatio-temporal infinity in the one and the other case? In our case, insofar as we can count on the generative infinity, we can ever again count on other men as carrier of the enlargement of our finite accessible world. (A serious clarification is needed here of the way the infinity of nature has its experiential sense for me and for everyone,<an> acceptance of being which is motivated and verifies itself univocally.) But how about the other case? If I did not have any fellow subjects, how about the actuality and possibility (that is, how about the possible ability to be demonstrated, possibility of the acceptance of being) of an endless world?

I, constantly having a consciousness of the world, can only “feign” myself as a *solus* in such a way, that I abstract from any co-existence of others, that is, [that I] accordingly fantasy my world as being different, or rather, myself as experiencing the world, as an Ego of the world-consciousness. But this abstraction does not change the fact that there <are> others within my habitual acceptance, and **[608]** [that] an intersubjective world is for me. Thus it is exactly like in primordial abstraction, only that I know the primordial Ego and the primordial world in the latter case as being included in my concrete Ego, which is an Ego of the world-consciousness, and [that] I then take account of this through the introduction of others’ acceptance of being, and of the motivation carrying them.

<§4. The bodily self-presence contained within each represented past world-present, and the problem of the beginning of my bodily existence>

Each current present in its flowing is concrete in the form of flowing proto-impressional present and of retentional (as well as protentional) changes, thus it flowingly carries a past within itself. Recollection is representation, the mode of representation of a concrete present. (How is it conceivable then that current present does begin?) The represented present already has a retention, it accordingly leaves open the possibility of recollection. Thus we arrive at an infinity. And we face a **paradox**: Each recollection implies recollections in infinity?

I am within flowing vivid present, I can be aware of myself only within it, as an Ego of its flowing life, and only as something being, which has already been being can[I] experientially be aware of it as being a flowing present. This [the vivid present] implies, I find then, beenness as flowing and as a possibility of recollection. How could I begin, where could a conscious life begin? Is flowing possible without a flowing into future? And is a concrete present as flowing conceivable without representing future in its being now, [without] fulfillingly actualizing protention in constant continuity? Is such a present conceivable without a proto-present phase (proto-impressional phase) being a fulfillment within the change of protentional modes? And are these conceivable without any continuity of retentionality “being prior in itself”, which again presupposes proto-impressionality being prior in itself? Paradoxes!

Saying “A perception can begin, it still always begins and then ends”, rightfully the answer should possibly be, that a “single” perception is a dependent element within the concrete flowing present to the structure of which a total perception belongs, in which the “single” [perception] is a dependent element. **Every beginning is an “interruption” within a flowing continuity**, which still cannot break, but can only experience discontinuities in abstract layers, whereas the correlative layers keep the continuity. Likewise any ending. For example within the sense-fields belonging to the original content of the flowing present.

**Thus, how can a concrete flowing present begin or end?** And how can I, vividly living within it, begin and end? I can begin to occupy myself with something, but I already have to “mentally live” to begin the occupation; it is within experiencing an “abstract” mode of life beginning in its continuity. I am able to – this is the interpretation of waking up – begin, to occupy myself, my activity can begin. But then I “**have been sleeping**” formerly or I was “dead” previously. Should this not be a mere mode of my being and of a flowing present in which, as a possible and actual **borderline case** all discontinuities and all activities vanish, while a unity of continuity remains unbreakable?

But flowing present, of which I am speaking concretely as a man in self-reflection[[5]](#footnote-5), is a flowing I-am within a conscious life in which the **world** is conscious to me, and <in which> the world-present is conscious in my present as being now (subjectively presently) perceived <and in which> world past and world future is conscious, explicitly within my current recollections and intuitional pre-expectancies, otherwise “horizon-like” as a co-opinion being implicit now. As to the perceptual **world-present**, it is in part as well an explicit perception within the content of something properly perceived, in part [it is] horizon-like. But all perception, memory, pre-expectancy, all explication of the horizon-like co-opinion happens **within my flowing present of consciousness**. We are able to, I am able to represent the world-past within my <within our> past by recollecting; it **[610]** is a represented world-present, more precisely i.e.: represented perception of the world, and within it perceived world-present –“past” within the modifying mode. It is thus at the same timea going back to my own conscious life, but as such [a conscious life] in which the **world** is conscious. Each recollection which I perform as a man as such, is itself a memory in which the **world** shows itself as given to me in a perceptual way. However far I let my memory go back – also the most ultimate, last to be achieved memory is a world-memory, memory of a perceptual present of the world. It is as being necessarily sensual also a memory of my former **bodiliness**, of my former being human. I am the same, my body is the same, although it has changed, the world is the same, only contentually different, the one spatio-temporal world, the one space, the one time; only the spatio-temporal modalities have another content. **Each present is already present of a past and a future, and as human present it is the present of the world and of my human being within the world**. This then holds true for any former present. Each implies its past (i.e. its “former” present), etc. , accordingly also the **most ultimate recollection** which we can force to be.

But is this not a **paradox**? The “most ultimate” memory does not actually need to be the last possible [memory]. But still the possibility cannot proceed into infinity. My body must have had a beginning as an organic body. We indeed have been born at some time. The answer is: We can only know about the psycho-physical birth by way of the others’ being co-present for us. And now the question is what is essentially implied within the possibility of recollection itself universally, within the issue of the possibility of the *solus*, what remains through memory when thinking away all fellow men being for us, through which we can in general bring temporal being and thereby the extension of temporality itself to original certainty of being.

In which other way can the world’s past be given to me than through memory, e.g. recollection, in which I remember myself as having perceived, as being able to perceive, etc.? Does this not demand an infinity within the possibility of recollection? And I had as *solus* in this way **[611]** or in mere abstraction from others from my own memory life access into an infinite time as world-time and into an infinity of my bodily human being.[[6]](#footnote-6) But this cannot be true. I remember my childhood and my bodily growth, and I will have also grown prior to the time, that [time] going beyond the time of my memory. But how do I know about this “prior to the time I remember”? What sense does this time horizon have if not that of <a> [horizon]which needed to be explicated through recollection? And if I take it as horizon of memory do I not arrive at an endless time of my bodily being? But if this was right, how could I not with the help of the community in which I humanly live in a constant way persist on attributing myself an endless time, an endless pre-existence? It is indeed, as it seems, an essential fact, it is sustained by. And does it not need to be taken into account that each new present has its heritage from the former present and that life is a constant learning-more, that within the going back into the past that which I have as experience, as knowledge, as ability shows itself as being ever more narrow, ever poorer? Does this not seem to point back to a **limes of impoverishing**, to a **beginning**?

Certainly the answer would have to be here: The heritage eventually lies within the flowing as acquiring through retention and protention and from there within the essential ability of memory, etc. **I do not arrive at any limes here**. But it is different with regard to the “performances” of **activity**, with regard to the acquiring of available possession of being. And the world simply is a possession of being, but from institution and from apperceptive transference.

But what kind of life does this relate to? The life experiencing nature goes through all memory and <through> manifold ways of occupying-oneself. – What kind of impoverishing? How is it to be explicated more concisely? What remains if we abstract from all intervention of the fellow men?

**[612]** At least as one of the possibilities that would have to emerge which I, as a man, born and living among men, have and had in advance. But does this possibility not dispute with that of an endless pre-existence which I had to attribute me as a *solus*? Does not my own being and my self-own world remain untouched in its essential content through the emergence of foreign bodies? This already shows that the seeming necessity of my endless pre-existence – taken from the fact that I, imagining my past, am always guided back to a bodily past, and, as it seems, inevitably *in infinitum* – cannot exist. But initially this would have to emerge as a mysterious question and become an issue.

Within these considerations we have not yet considered **the world in the simultaneity**, the way that someone reduced to being a *solus* could have it, that is, the question of the finitude or infinity of his **space**.

Each perception is perception of a worldly present, but within the indefeasible apperceptive tension of that which is properly perceived, and [that which is] anticipated as co-present. Can I think of a concrete present world otherwise than as a universe of persisting realities, persisting in stillness and motion, in unchanging and in change? Does not change essentially point to unchanging, motion to stillness? This means: Can the being-sense of the one emerge without a prior being-sense of the other? On the other hand: Is the common being-sense of stillness as an open possibility to go over into motion, like vice versa, not itself something being later, <pointing towards> a stillness being free from such being-sense which is related to motion? – We will thus prefer a case of resting and unchanged bodily existence.

We, finding us as men within human community, are those who, while being constantly aware of our living within our constantly experienced world, consider all possibilities of a world as such and of changes of human subjects and thereby of possibilities of subjects as such, among others the possibility that we respectively existed solitarily, [that we] only then discovered others, etc. Possibilities, considered critically, show themselves as being evident and then right possibilities, or as being false, i.e. as absurdities – **[613]** since the question relates to possibilities as conceivabilities in general and not as empirical possibilities. The decisive evidences are our own evidences. Thus all possibilities themselves lie within us and presuppose us as their carrier; we precede them as what we are. Is it not a part of our world’s **essence** and of us as subjects of the world’s consciousness that we ourselves are to be found in any conceivable world being fantasiable for us as being fantasied as different accordingly, that we are thus communalized as actual subjects with all fainted and to be fainted [subjects]? Every other one being for me by understanding my fiction and by taking part in it, can be found together with me in my fainted world –fantasied as different. Everyone is in any possible world and is in his actuality presupposition of his possibilities and of his world, as of every possible world. But considered more closely, **I, being for me** the way I am, **precede this “we” and the being of the world**, which is only world **for us** due to the “we” being **my** “we”.

And the world for me is not at first my surrounding world, that of the solitary man, from which I first of all had to discover the other ones, but for me the world de facto never is in another way than as a world for everyone. It needs to be emphasized as essential fact that I as being for me the way I am, I, living as a man within the constant certainty of the world’s being, and thereby living my world-life, **cannot conceive of me as anything else than as being related to others as fellow subjects** and as fellow subjects of the world as mine which as mine necessarily is ours, our – of all subjects being for me and inseparable from my being.

But thereby the **issue** we brought up becomes ever anew urgent: how it is to be understood that our subjectivity and within it respectively mine, the reflecting one’s [subjectivity], shall be a <subjectivity> giving sense to the world we are respectively speaking of, which we respectively experience, and respectively think of, constituting it as habitual intentional acquisition, and then shall still emerge among the acquisitions, namely among the spatio-temporal realities within the world. Can this indeed be correct? Can the **subjectivity constituting the world** actually be a **constituted** one at the same time without further ado? “World-constituting subjectivity”, this means in the first place: currently constituting, from which just all habitual acquisitions emerge, which **[614]** thus doubtlessly has to proceed. Has to proceed whom? In any case me, who I am able to have others only as being for me from my originally own acquiring of the same and thereby just <arrive> at acquiring the same with their proper being-sense, to be acquiring Ego-subjects.

<§5,> The experiencing ways of consciousness, through which we are conscious of ourselves as being within the world, that is, as human beings, <and the body as organ for the personal self-givenness of everything belonging to the world>

The world being for us is originally-currently given, namely perceived and experienced as such. This experience is “**personally**” self-giving, self-presenting. Self-presentation is the peculiarity of the experiencing consciousness as such. As long as experience and experience of something worldly coincide as a matter of course, it is the same to be personally given, to present oneself and to experience oneself personally, to show oneself intuitionally (in unbroken certainty of being). On the other hand they say: “Men are “**there in person**” or “have been there””, whereby it shall be said that they are there perceptually or have been there; like they also say that men (and animals) are bodily within the world. The latter seems to simply say that they are some kind of combined realities: not mere bodies, but in one bodies and souls, or realities having purely bodily properties like for example stones or plants (regarded as merely “organic” bodies, <as> a special type of bodies as such), and at the same time “psychic” properties. Nevertheless, here the peculiarity is that **the experience of this “combined” or “double-layered” real**, through which alone something like man and animal makes sense for us, is not only basically different with regard to “organism” and “soul”, but also with regard to “organism” and “body being no organism”, being “unanimated body”.

**The experiences of all unanimated bodies are similar to each other**. An endless system of possible sensual perceptions as such of the same body belongs to each current perception which is merely a “sensual” perception for such real things, and **[615]** <is> insofar in a peculiar way implied in every single experience, as it is possible to construct the system from it. The essential type of this system is the same for all unanimated bodies as objects of my possible merely sensual experience, and the same within the sensually experiencing life of any kind of subject. If the experiences of a subject communalize with <those> of any other <subject> communicating with him, then the way of their common experience and the common being sense accruing therein is the same for all bodies.

But how about the **organisms** now? First of all my organism obviously has a basically different kind of experience for me than all other bodies do for me, whether they are animated bodies or unanimated bodies. Since now the organisms of all the other men (and animals) being experienceable for me are nevertheless bodies and are necessarily separated from my organism, and [are] never to be exchanged against my own organism, thus **a difference between the experience of my organism and that of all foreign organisms yields which is irreconcilable**. Again this holds essentially true for everyone with regard to his organism and to his external bodies, among them bodies being foreign for him. One beholds at the same time that **each organism has two kinds of experience: one kind for his subject, the other kind for all other subjects**.

Nevertheless each organism is in a certain way, and exactly the way it is treated within natural science, still a **body** like other bodies: It does not have all physical (natural) properties, through <which> it is an object within universal nature, in a different way than other bodies. It has the universal properties (the apriori, mathematical [properties] as well as the empirically universal ones of physics and chemistry), and on top of that the special properties, according to the empirical types of the natural bodies. But as body, which is an organism, organism for any Ego-subject, it has additionally a de facto new group of properties, of supra-physical, so-called psychic [properties]. Initially it has the basic property to be an “**organ**” of the human subject, a title universally encompassing a multiplicity of properties. As an organ it functions in all perceptions of merely bodily properties (sensual perceptions).[[7]](#footnote-7) It is as an organ of the human Ego a unity of a multiplicity of special organs. On top of that and founded therein it is a practical organ, again with regard to all bodies, treating <these> as well as <for> the practice founded therein.[[8]](#footnote-8) If we stick to the organism as functioning as an organ of perception in all bodily perception then this odd peculiarity implies: Whenever a body, an external body, is originally consciously and actively grasped by me as it itself, **then my organism is involved, which thus is always sensually experienced** together with whatever else may be experienced, - and not only being experienced along, but also **functioning for the experience of everything**: I perceive that which is: I see with the eyes, they are visually sensitive, and while seeing I move them, and according to this egoical motion I now have this, now that perspective appearances according to my oculomotoric and other “kinesthetic situation”, or rather [I have] within the kinesthetic motion processes of corresponding appearances. And likewise for every sense, although for each in a special way; always the **egoical kinesthesis** belongs to the egoical functioning, and I have <the> respective appearances and changes of appearance as such of the same object presenting itself therein through it.

During the experience of the body as spatio-temporally persisting within the change of the “bodily” appearances, I also experience in a certain way the organic motion as organic, as an organic motion proceding from me with the help of the kinesthesis, and again I somehow experience the appearances as organic sensations, as those of the touching fingers, of the sniffing nose, etc. That which is called “sensation” or “organic sensibility” there, comes to the fore while turning the regard from the appearing bodily, e.g. from its tactual, to the respective organic part, which is called “organ” of the respective, here of the tactual perception. **But all these “sensations”, the kinesthesis and the sensual intuitions are nothing** **[617] natural**; natural science does not know any kinesthesis, no perspective ways of appearance, etc., as little as subjective perspective appearances, subjective orientations, etc. Proceeding within the multiplicity of sensual presentations, apprehensions, perspective ways of appearance, of closeness and distance, etc., in a certain sense as “consequent” of the kinesthesis as antecedent (that is in the connections of the when- and why-thus), the same body shows itself perceptually to me (and thus to anyone), that is, in different givenness of the sides, as that of which respectively that and then that can be seen, can be grasped sensually. These motivational connections of the if and thus have no place within the bodies, they belong to the “governing” Ego, the “motions” of which are no bodily motions, the appearances of which exist in no nature.

Thus I also experience each foreign organism as body while governing within my organism, [while] bringing into play its parts which are experienced by me as organs. **But I cannot bring the foreign organism into play**, I cannot move it kinesthetically, I cannot experience it as an organism in that original way as mine, the only originally experienced organism. And yet, I also grasp it as an organism, as an organ without further ado – as the organ of a **foreign** Ego-subject which is only there for me by way of this kind of experience, [which] becomes conscious to me as belonging to the world and certain of being. However this experiencing-someone-else (his governing within his organism, his perceiving thereby, [his] thereby acting by practically pushing, lifting it for example, in contrast to the original proper perceiving, pushing, etc.) is to be described more concisely – may it be called “empathy” or “understanding experiencing” or whatever -, it nevertheless is **experience**. But we now resort to this in order to point to the fact that by empathizing experiencing of the other the peculiarity accrues for me, **that I, understanding his experiencing, normally extend my experiencing through his own into that which is experienced by him**, that I can in advance only perceive him as another man if I understand him in a main content as experiencing **the same** which I experience directly, and understand him within another content as experiencing such thing which I could bring to my own direct perception with corresponding kinesthetic locomotion. **This communalization is the basis of the inter-subjective being-sense “body”** as being experienceable for me and for my other ones and mediately for everyone whom I could encounter, experienceable as being the same for us all, for each single one and for random ones as possibly communalizing themselves.

This of course holds true for the organisms themselves as well. They are “intersubjectively being” objects. How come? They are simply for me now **functioning** organisms and above all in the functions of perceiving, and that for the subjects of these organisms, and now, namely for all the other subjects, to which these organisms to not belong as their organs, nevertheless objects of possible sensual perception, bodies like any “mere” bodies. With the help of my organism, bringing it into play as my organ, and respectively according to these or those special organs (eyes, hands, etc.), I have my perceptual bodily surrounding world.[[9]](#footnote-9)

1. 14th December 1932. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. This needs to be created as a paradox. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Constituting subjectivity and man in the world. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Does this not hold true for animals as well? But also of the “lesser” ones? [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The consideration remains within primordiality. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This is too quick. And only to be understood preliminarily. I will call attention to the necessity of distinguishing between memory, recollection and pre-memory and anticipation as that of possible perception, of possible memory, of possible pre-expectation: I could perceive, I could have perceived, - I could have actually or I could have if there had not been any restraints, under conditions, I could have remembered “if”. But the question of demonstration. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Organ of perception. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. The organism is not similar to an instrument which can be put aside. Each instrument is only mediately an “organ”, it presupposes the immediate bodily operating, that of the Ego; and no less each putting aside. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. What is this for? What role should this play for the issue of the paradoxes? [↑](#footnote-ref-9)